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In this paper, we modeled several types of housing transitions of the elderly in two countries -- Britain
and the United States.  One important form of these transitions involves downsizing of housing consumption,
the importance of which among older households is still debated. This downsizing takes multiple forms,
including reductions in the number of rooms per dwelling and the value of the home. There is also
evidence that this downsizing is greater when house price volatility is greater and that American households
try to escape housing price volatility by moving to places that are experience significantly less housing
price volatility. Our comparative evidence in suggests that there is less evidence of downsizing in
Britain. Our results indicate that housing consumption appears to decline with age in the US, even
after controlling for the other demographic and work transitions associated with age that would normally
produce such a decline. No such fall in housing consumption is found in Britain, largely because British
households are much more likely to stay in their original residence.
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In this paper we will document and model the housing transitions of the elderly in two 
countries—England and the United States. One important form of these transitions involves 
downsizing, but there remains considerable controversy even about what the facts are about 
downsizing at older ages. This controversy stems partly from the absence until recently of long 
panel data on the housing wealth and circumstances of elderly households. It may also flow from 
a relatively narrow view of what downsizing is for the purposes of empirical modeling—selling a 
home and becoming a renter. Other dimensions that are now possible to analyze include selling a 
home to move into a smaller place either as a renter or owner, or moving in with family or 
friends, renting out rooms, or simply reducing maintenance and repairs (see Davidoff (2004)).  
Thus, in addition to the transition into renting, we will document and model the factors 
associated with downsizing across several of these relevant dimensions.
1 We will examine the 
extent to which these transitions are co-incident or near other salient events such as retirement or 
widowhood by estimating models for the empirically important types of housing transitions over 
multiple waves of our panel data. While other literature has looked at some of these transitions in 
the US, the contribution of our analysis, in addition to broadening the empirical analysis to 
include multiple downsizing measures, is to exploit the longer sample periods now available to 
look at transitions over a longer horizon where we are more likely to see evidence of downsizing 
if it does exist in the data. We also provide, to our knowledge the first systematic comparison of 
downsizing behavior between the US and Britain, where there has been much less empirical 
evidence on downsizing to date.
2 
A second contribution of this paper is to discuss and model the potential role of house price 
volatility, which we have previously studied by us for younger households’ home ownership and 
housing consumption decisions (Banks et al. (2003, 2005)), in the housing decisions of the 
                                                 
1  Less immediately transparent forms of downsizing - reducing additions and repairs or renting 
out rooms - will be dealt with, to the extent that data allow, in subsequent research. 
2 For an exception, see Disney et al (2002) which looked at housing wealth and savings trajectories for 
older households in the UK between 1988 and 1994.   4
elderly. In addition to any type of downsizing in housing consumption that may occur, some 
housing transitions at older ages may reflect an attempt to escape from the risk associated with a 
highly price volatile asset given the relatively short remaining life span. For example, housing 
price risk at older ages may encourage moving to less price volatile areas but leave intact 
ownership status as well as the level of real housing consumption. Among those who do sell their 
homes to buy another, we will therefore also document the transitions between housing-price safe 
and volatile areas even if home size does not change.  
Since it places the future flow of non-housing consumption at risk, greater housing price 
risk provides an incentive to reduce housing consumption more quickly (at an earlier age) or 
equivalently to downsize in all forms. Greater (mean preserving) price risk increases the 
probability that individuals will want to increase their savings in safe assets. Since holding a 
house in a volatile area is not a safe asset, this implies that the desire to downsize is greater when 
house price risks are higher. These effects will be mitigated to the extent households have 
annuitized incomes.  
Because housing price volatility is temporally and spatially variable, our empirical analysis 
will document the importance of the role of house price volatility using comparable panel data 
analysis for the US and Britain. One reason motivating our choice of comparison countries is the 
significant differences in housing price variability between these two countries—Britain has 
considerably higher house price volatility, with the relatively safe regions having comparable 
volatility to the most risky regions of the US (see Banks et al. (2005) for example). Consequently, 
if volatility matters one might expect differences in downsizing behavior across countries.  
Of course there may be many other differences between the two countries and hence, in 
contrast to the descriptive evidence comparing the two countries, our empirical analysis will 
exploit within country regional and time-series variation in volatility to identify the effects of 
volatility on downsizing behavior. This distinction between these two approaches turns out to be   5
important. At the broadest level, our descriptive comparison of the two countries reveals less 
downsizing behavior in Britain than in the US—a result at odds with the idea that higher volatility 
should lead to greater downsizing. Once we look within country and also control for other 
covariates, however, we find a positive correlation between downsizing and volatility in the US, 
and a qualitatively similar although statistically weaker effect within Britain. This suggests that 
other differences between the two countries are driving the international differences and some 
potential factors are discussed briefly in the spirit of topics for future research. 
A third contribution of our paper is to examine more generally the long contested issue of 
whether households in both countries at sufficiently old age reduce their consumption. In 
particular the question we ask is whether consumption of housing declines in addition to any 
changes induced by a set of demographic changes producing smaller households and the decision 
to retire from the labor force.  Since housing is an important component of total consumption and 
if anything is believed to one of the resistant to any downward changes, we believe that evidence 
showing a downward path of housing consumption adds important evidence to the more general 
debate on the nature of consumption trajectories at older ages.  
This paper is divided into six sections. Section 1 outlines and discusses implications from 
a simple theoretical model of the impact of housing price variability on life-cycle choices 
regarding housing decisions with an emphasis on its implications for downsizing during late life. 
Section 2 describes the data sources used in both Britain and US. Section 3 documents the 
principal facts about the extent of different forms of late life downsizing in both countries and 
their possible relation to housing price variability within and between Britain and US. In Section 
4 we summarize the predictions to be tested and provide the results of the empirical tests of our 
model. Section 5 uses the results of previous sections to present and discuss age-trajectories of 
housing consumption at older ages in the two countries. In the final section we present our 
conclusions.    6
1. Theoretical Model 
Economic theory has implications about the possibility of downsizing at older ages for 
a number of reasons. As families progress through the life cycle, the demand for the 
consumption of housing services is likely to fall. For example, it is a standard implication of life 
cycle models that at sufficiently older ages as mortality risks rise, total household consumption 
(of which housing is an important part) will fall with age. While the extent of the actual fall in 
total household consumption remains a matter of active debate, it appears to be the case that 
at sufficiently older ages household consumption does indeed fall with age, most likely 
reflecting the combined influences of time preferences and mortality risk. When total 
consumption falls, housing consumption should also fall since if it did not, all reductions in 
total consumption would have to take place in non-housing consumption alone. 
1.1 The Demographic Ladder 
The second and perhaps more immediately apparent reason that one might expect 
reductions in housing consumption at older ages are demographic. One useful description of the 
demographic forces is the housing ladder, which we see as demographically driven as individuals 
marry, form families with children aging and growing in their housing needs. Eventually people 
complete their family building with older children starting to leave home to go off on their own. 
Figure 1.A depicts this demographic process by plotting by age for the United States three 
dimensions of the demographic ladder—the fraction of families who had completed their family, 
the fraction of families who ever have had a child at least five years old, and the fraction of 
families who currently have a child at least five years old in the household.
3 A parallel set of 
graphs are provided for Britain in Figure 1.B. 
                                                 
3 This figure plots the cumulative fraction of individuals who completed their family size by age. This was obtained 
from data on individuals aged 50 and over by taking the age at which they had their last child as being the age they 
completed their family.   7
The demographic housing life-cycle can be divided into five broad stages: In the first 
stage, an individual is living with their parents; in the second, they form partnerships; and in 
the third goes on to have children and complete their family size. In the remainder of the life 
cycle, in stage four, children leave home; and the final stage is widowhood. At each stage, 
there is a decision to buy or rent and a decision about a minimum level of housing 
consumption necessary to meet needs. The demography depicted in Figures 1.A and 1.B, 
which are remarkably similar in both countries, indicates that housing demand will grow 
during the early and middle parts of life, but may then reverse as children leave home and go 
off on their own.  
Since the fraction of families with a child over age 5 in the household peaks around age 
forty in both countries, the fraction of families with children under age 18 will peak in the 
mid fifties and the demographically driven demand for housing should peak at this age or before. 
Multiple children should matter as well in housing demand. Further reductions in housing 
demand at older ages will flow from divorce and/or widowhood as people enter the final stage of 
life without a partner. 
1.2 Housing Price Risk 
The third factor that may influence decisions to downsize concerns the influence of housing 
price risk. In an earlier paper (Banks, Blundell, Oldfield, and Smith (2005)), we investigated the 
influence of housing price risk on the decision to own a home during rising upward part of the 
demographic housing ladder. To summarize, one possible solution to the changing housing 
demand over the life cycle is to simply purchase the amount of housing one requires at each 
stage, but high transactions costs serve as an effective barrier to that strategy.  
Another solution would be to rent in the early stages and then purchase the ‘right’ 
presumably larger home when family size is complete. The difficulty with that strategy is that 
housing price volatility may means that you are priced out of this market at the time when you   8
need to purchase your family home. Since there are no market insurance devices that can insure 
against this risk, one can only self-insure against the future housing price volatility. To provide 
this insurance, a household wishes to hold an asset with a value correlated with house prices they 
will face in the future. Holding housing equity essentially provides some insurance against high 
house prices later. Since, in the absence of a formal market, the only way to obtain housing equity 
is to buy a house, to insure themselves, individuals must purchase a house earlier than they may 
have wanted based on housing consumption demographic needs alone. Thus, the more volatile 
house prices are, the greater the insurance motive of owning a house in the early phrases of the 
demographic ladder depicted in Figure 1.  
This paper is motivated by an extension of our model into the older stages of the life 
cycle—the stage that involves children leaving home and widowhood. Are people willing to 
downsize in order to fund their retirement consumption, and how is this decision affected by the 
presence of volatile house prices?  
The integration of housing price risk into a single theoretical framework is complex and 
even algebraic closed form solutions will only be possible under certain forms of preferences. 
Ideally, however, we want such a framework to use relatively flexible preferences (such as 
CRRA) that also have some minimum housing needs or requirement that must be met in each 
period and as such analytical solutions can be hard to come by. We have confirmed the 
predictions that follow in a numerical simulation of a simple three period model of the latter 
stages of life to capture the stages of the demographic ladder identified in the previous section, 
with CRRA utility, house price risk, a minimum housing requirement that rises and then falls 
with the housing ladder, and a simplified form of mortality risk.  For the purposes of this paper, 
and in the absence of analytical results, we focus instead on intuitive descriptions of the 
mechanisms in play.    9
The first thing to note is that the model is not symmetric with regard to the role of 
volatility in early as opposed to late life. In the rising phrase of the housing ladder, individuals 
wants to self-insure so that they will not be forced to live in a house that is too small when their 
housing demand is high in mid-life. In volatile areas, expected price volatility induces one to 
move into home ownership at a younger age and hence to reduce consumption of other goods. 
On the later rungs of the household ladder however housing is no longer required in order 
to meet an insurance need. Instead, when household size is no longer expected to rise, housing 
reverts to a more straightforward risky asset which individuals (if they are risk averse) may wish 
to avoid  Put simply, in the later stages of life or the downsize of the housing ladder, one may 
want to release some housing consumption to consume other goods. Greater housing price risk 
(whether in the form of greater house equity for a given level of risk, or greater risk for a given 
level of equity) puts that decision at risk, thereby encouraging homeowners in more price volatile 
areas to either downsize more rapidly than they might have wanted, to rent, or to move to areas 
with less house price volatility. Another option is equity withdrawal or reverse mortgages, which 
not only provide some insurance against mortality risk but also slowly reduces uncertainty about 
the equity. But like many annuities this market is quite thin, perhaps due to standard adverse 
selection issues. 
Downsizing essentially involves cashing in housing equity. You want to do this because 
you want to use housing wealth to finance future non-housing consumption, but as with any 
approaching asset realization, an optimal path would be to gradually reduce risk and move into 
safe assets to avoid exposure to shocks at the time of realization that will have permanent effects. 
(This is a mechanism directly analogous to the prediction in the pensions literature that as 
retirement approaches the optimal pension portfolio is to gradually switch out of stocks and into 
bonds).   10
There are, of course, many good reasons why individuals may not want to downsize. One is 
that they may have build up a ‘habitual’ demand for this house as they may over time have fitted 
it to their tastes, or they may want children to return to the home in which they were raised. The 
cost of not downsizing is that all other consumption may have to absorb more of the fall. 
If you do decide to downsize, the specific timing may be coordinated with other salient 
events—indeed our description of the housing ladder is event-specific as opposed to age or time-
specific. One event may be retirement since one’s work is location-specific even in there is 
housing price risk. The other is widowhood or other forms of marital dissolution where, at a 
minimum, the old house may be too big. Thus, any downsizing that does take place may be 
correlated with retirement, widowhood, or divorce and our empirical analysis will need to allow 
for these transitions.  
In the discussion above we have not addressed the issue that, conditional on location, house 
price volatility may not be avoidable by switching to the rental sector, since rental prices may be 
more volatile as well in such areas, which may indeed generate a demand for owner-occupation to 
avoid rent risk (see Sinai and Souleles (2005)). Several things are worth mentioning here. Firstly, 
the mechanisms discussed above relate to stock of housing wealth as opposed to the flows of 
period by period housing costs associated with ownership or rental respectively. Although once 
mortgages are paid off, the risk associated with house price fluctuations for home-owners is all 
related to the value of assets and not post-housing cost incomes so the relative comparison of 
ownership to rental is changed in favor of owner-occupation the fact that horizons are shorter 
would weaken the importance of such an effect.  
Second, in our framework, switching from an owner to a renter is just one way that an 
individual can choose to downsize. This means that our framework is compatible with that of 
Sinai and Souleles because individuals who wish to avoid both rental risk and house price risk 
can do so by downsizing in ways which they can remain an owner occupier. Finally, even when it 
comes to home-ownership itself, in contrast to the up stage of the ladder the prediction here is that   11
more volatility would lead to lower ownership rates—a mechanism that would work against that 
described above so if anything. To the extent that the above two considerations do not totally 
remove the relevance of rental price risk (relative to ownership) in volatile areas, we may be 
underestimating the effect of volatility in our empirical models.  
1.3 Other Risks 
Of course, other risks that may or may not be correlated with house price risk, may also 
matter for households’ housing and downsizing decisions. Perhaps the two most natural to think 
of are income risk and mortality or morbidity risk. On the assumption that most downsizing takes 
place at or after retirement, income risk is most likely of only second order importance since there 
is no earnings risk and large fractions of the incomes of retired households may well have some 
degree of inflation protection.  
More important is likely to be health risks, and there are several ways in which additional 
health risk may also affect housing wealth and non-housing wealth accumulation and 
decumulation decisions at older ages. Especially when health insurance is not complete, it 
increases the risks of additional out-of-pocket expenditures, particularly at the tails, which should 
encourage additional precautionary savings.  
Before retirement, morbidity risk also shows up as one of the determinants of income risk 
and thus will have effects similar to those described in the previous section. Holding a risky asset 
such as housing when prices are highly volatile may be a dubious strategy when one faces 
additional health risk. A spread in pure mortality risk (making it more likely you will live longer 
as well as shorter) will make risk-averse agents engage in more precautionary savings in all forms 
in face of an added risk of living too long. This effect will depend both on the extent to which 
retirement incomes have been annuitized (which varies a great deal across our countries) and the 
importance of any bequest motive that might exist. We will not incorporate health risk into this   12
draft but note that it is an important topic, on which we are gradually gaining a better empirical 
understanding, for inclusion in future drafts. 
2. Sources of Data 
This research will rely on micro-data from the US and Britain. For the US, we will use the 
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and primarily the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). For Britain, we will use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Besides the 
standard set of demographics on age, schooling, family income, marriage and other aspects of 
family building, outcomes information available in all these surveys include several aspects of 
housing choice—ownership, size of house, and value of house.  
HRS 
This research uses a set of surveys of the over-age 50 population: the original Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS-original) and the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old 
(AHEAD. HRS-original is a national sample of about 7,600 households (12,654 individuals) with 
at least one person in the birth cohorts of 1931-1941 (about 51-61 years old at baseline). AHEAD 
includes 6,052 households (8,222 individuals) with at least one person born in 1923 or earlier (70 
or over in 1993). Follow-ups have taken place at two-year intervals. 
HRS housing section includes wave-by-wave data about tenure (renter or owner), value and 
purchase price of the home, outstanding mortgages (and hence home equity) and monthly 
mortgage payments, whether the household refinanced since the last interview, other fixed 
payments (e.g., property taxes, fuels, etc), rents (if a renter), and number of rooms. Information is 
also available on second homes. In this draft of the paper, HRS is used simply to confirm the 
principal patterns of changing housing demand obtained from the PSID during later life. 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
The PSID has gathered almost 30 years of extensive economic and demographic data on a 
nationally representative sample of approximately 5,000 (original) families and 35,000   13
individuals who live in those families. Details on family income and its components have been 
gathered in each wave since the inception of PSID in 1967. Starting in 1984 and in five-year 
intervals until 1999, PSID asked questions to measure household wealth. Starting in 1997, the 
PSID switched to a two-year periodicity, and wealth modules are now part of the core interview.  
In each wave, the PSID asks detailed questions on family size and composition, schooling, 
education, age, and marital status. State of residence is available in every year and individuals are 
followed to new locations if they move. Unlike other American wealth surveys, PSID is 
representative of the complete age distribution. Yearly housing tenure questions determine 
whether individuals own, rent or live with others. Questions on value and mortgage were asked in 
each wave of the PSID. Renters are asked the rent they pay and both owners and renters are asked 
the number of rooms in the residence. Health conditions and timing of onset were added in 1999. 
British Household Panel Survey—BHPS 
The BHPS has been running annually since 1991 and, like the PSID, is also representative 
of the complete age distribution. The wave 1 sample consisted of some 5,500 households and 
10,300 individuals. The BHPS contains annual information on individual and household income 
and employment as well as a complete set of demographic variables and has several other 
features to recommend it. There is an extensive amount of information on mortgages and housing 
(including number of rooms) that enables us to measure housing wealth in each wave of the data
4. 
Regional variation in ownership and housing wealth accumulation will be essential in our tests 
and the data will provide us with sufficient observations per year in each region to carry out our 
tests. 
Housing Price Volatility 
For the US, housing price data to measure housing price risk were obtained form the Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise (OFHEO) House Price Index. This data contain quarterly and 
                                                 
4 With the exception of 1992 when house value was only collected for those living at new addresses.   14
yearly price indexes for the value of single-family homes in the US in the individual states and 
the District of Columbia.
5 This data use repeat transactions for the same houses to obtain a quality 
constant index and is available for all years starting in 1974. All yearly housing prices by state are 
reported relative to those that prevailed in 1980. By 1995 there were almost 7 million repeat 
transactions in the data so that the number of observations for each state is reasonably large. No 
demographic data are available with this index. 
For Britain, regional house price data to measure housing price risk will be obtained from 
the Nationwide Building Society House Price series, which is a quarterly regional house price 
series going back to 1974. Rather than use a repeat sales index, the prices are adjusted for 
changes in the mix of sales to approximate a composition constant index, and are also seasonally 
adjusted.  
  As with our previous paper (Banks et al 2006), housing volatility is defined using a 
moving five-year window. That is, our measure of volatility is the standard deviation of the house 
price around its trend in the five-years prior to the observation. What should matter for individual 
decisions of course is the conditional variance of expected house prices over the individuals 
horizon and in this respect our measure is only crude, intending simply to capture that the recent 
past might be used as a prediction of the future. Nevertheless, sensitivity analysis in previous 
papers revealed the empirical conclusions to be broadly unaffected by choice of window-length 
within reasonable ranges, and subject to the constraints of, and subsequent impacts on, the 
amount of time-series variation available. Finally, with regard to picking out regional as opposed 
to time-series variation in volatility, we are confident that the measure picks out the risky from 
the safe regions both within and across countries.  
3. Establishing the Facts 
                                                 
5 For details on this data see “OFHEO House Price Indexes: HPI Technical Description,” by Charles A. Calhoun, 
March 1996.    15
Even the basic question of whether housing is downsized as people age is not well 
answered in the literature. For example, Venti and Wise (2001) concluded, based on the AHEAD 
data in the United States, that, after controlling for transitions into widow hood and nursing 
homes, the elderly do not generally reduce housing equity as they age. Yet, Sheiner and Weil 
(1992) estimated that among households entering old age owning a home, just 41% still own 
when the surviving spouse dies.  
One source of the differences that emerge in the current literature is that moving out of 
home ownership is only but one form downsizing may take. Individuals may sell the original 
family home to move into a smaller one whilst remaining owners either in the same or a different 
general location. They can also remain home owners even if the size of the home is the same but 
move to a less expensive and less volatile place. They may also invest less in upkeep of their 
home, an implicit form of downsizing, or rent a room out. Or, they may move into the home of 
another relative (especially children) or have them move into their own home, perhaps with 
shared ownership. The years around labor market retirement and the death of a spouse may be 
especially important ones for these transitions. Very little is currently known about the magnitude 
and reasons for these broader cumulative transitions or about any international differences that 
might exist. In this section, we document the principal empirical facts around these issues in both 
the United States and the United Kingdom. 
3.a Home Ownership Rates at Older Ages 
Especially at older ages most Americans are homeowners. Based on multiple waves of the 
PSID, Table 1.a presents tenure status for individuals by age of the household head for ten year 
age groups starting at age 50, concluding with a residual category of those 80 plus years old. 
Using the same format, Table 1.b lists parallel data derived from the BHPS for individuals in 
Britain. For both countries, the data are also stratified by whether or not the household lives in an 
area characterized by volatile housing prices.   16
Table 1.a shows that slightly more than eighty percent of all American individuals over age 
50 are homeowners. Approximately one in every six Americans in this age group are renters, 
while a relatively small fraction are in the catch all ‘other categories’ that largely consist of living 
with relatives or in a nursing home. Among older Americans, there is a gradual decline in the 
fraction who are home owners across age groups post age 70. Below age 70, home ownership 
rates are about 83%—above age 80 the rate is 66%. Most of the decline in the probability of 
owning a home appears as an increase in renting but some of it, particularly among those over age 
70, reflects an increase in the likelihood of living with others or in a nursing home. 
For British individuals over age 50 (summarized in Table 1.b), the probability of being a 
homeowner is about thirteen percentage points lower than that of American individuals, a deficit 
mostly offset by a higher probability of renting. There is a much sharper negative age pattern in 
Britain compared to the US across the age groups depicted in Table 1. Among those in their 
fifties for example, there is less than a seven percentage point difference in home ownership rates 
between the two countries—by ages 80+ the likelihood of owning a home is seventeen 
percentage points lower in Britain compared to the US. As documented in Banks, Blundell, and 
Smith (2003), this sharp negative age gradient in home owning rates in Britain largely reflects 
cohort effects and the sale at subsidized rates of government owned council housing.   
In the United States, homeownership rates are much higher in non-risky housing price 
locales than in the risky ones. One might be tempted to attribute this difference to the fact that 
housing prices are also considerably higher in the risky places, but that temptation is deterred by 
the fact that the reverse pattern appears in to be the case in Britain even though housing prices in 
Britain are also higher in the more volatile housing price places.  
3.b Changes in Housing Tenure with Age 
Our principal concern in this paper involves not homeownership status per se but rather the 
transitions in tenure that takes place at older ages. The very pronounced cohort effects in housing 
status in Britain documented in the previous section indicate that it would be perilous to attempt   17
to read housing transitions from cross-sectional age housing tenure patterns, especially in Britain. 
Instead, in this section we will highlight the salient transitions using the panel nature of the data 
in the US and Britain. 
Since much of the existing research on downsizing at older ages focuses on the decision to 
sell one’s original home and become a renter, we begin with the transitions conditional or 
originally being a homeowner. Table 2 examines these tenure transitions in the United States 
(using the PSID) and Britain (using the BHPS) for a sub population who are at least fifty years 
old and who were originally home owners in the initial period. Because the extent of the 
transitions that place will depend on the length of the window during which we allow households 
to adjust their status, the data are presented for three different durations between the waves of the 
panel—two years apart, five years apart, and ten years apart. All tenure transitions are presented 
separately for risky and non-risky price areas. Finally, Table 3 organizes the data in precisely the 
same way for those who were initially renters.  
These two year transitions may illustrate why there is some skepticism about downsizing 
being an important dimension of behavior at older ages. Across a two year period, only eleven 
percent of American homeowners move and only one in twenty relocate during a single year. 
Such mobility is even less in Britain where only about six percent of British home owning 
households relocate over a two year horizon. However, as we allow the number of years between 
the survey waves to expand, the extent of mobility taking place increases significantly. To 
illustrate, over a decade, almost one in every three American home owners who were at least fifty 
years old moved out of an originally owned home. Among those Americans who did move, 
however, 71% of them remained homeowners by purchasing another home. Another 22% of them 
became renters while the rest do a collection of things, including moving in with family members 
or into group dwellings. 
Mobility among homeowners is clearly less in Britain for older households. Across the 
same ten year span between survey waves, about one in every four British homeowners relocated   18
compared to about one in three American households. In these simple tabulations, in neither 
Britain nor the US does an owner’s propensity to sell a home appear to depend on whether one 
lives in a housing price risky or non-risky locale.  
Table 3 demonstrates that—not surprisingly—renters in both countries are far more mobile 
than owners. Across the ten year survey interval, 72% of American renters moved at least once 
compared to 40% of British renters so that once again British households are less mobile than 
their American counterparts. Most of these originally renting households remain so and simply 
settle into another apartment or flat. But a little more than one in every four American renters 
who do relocate over age fifty subsequently become homeowners—the comparable British 
number is one third. While these transitions rates were similar between risky and non-risky areas 
for home owners, it appears that renters in non-risky areas are more likely to move in the US. 
Table 4 displays patterns of housing tenure transitions by ten year age groups for those 
owners who are at least age 50 and Table 5 does the same for those who were originally renters. 
In the United States, until after 80, roughly two-thirds of home owners do not move to another 
place over a ten year window. However, among those who do move, a growing fraction of them 
do not purchase another home. Rather they increasingly move into rental properties and to a less 
extent into either assisted living or to stay with family members. The probability of a homeowner 
moving into a rental property is far less in Britain than in the US and it is a good deal less likely 
at older ages for an home owner in Britain to subsequently become a renter.  
In the United States and in Britain, renters become increasingly less mobile with age, once 
again with an important exception noted during the 80s in the US. Forty-one percent of American 
renters in their seventies stay in the same place over a ten year horizon compared to twenty-two 
percent of American renters in the fifties. Across all age groups, many more American renters 
relocate in the non-risky areas compared to the risky ones. 
Table 5 demonstrates that a good deal of the additional mobility among renters in the US in 
non-risky areas involves larger movements from renter to owner status (compared to the risky   19
areas). To this point, we have emphasized the incentives involved in these housing decisions from 
the point of view of owners. However, the arguments are completely symmetric. From the 
perspective of those who were originally renters, changing from being a renter to an owner of 
housing in a house price risky area would make little sense indeed. That transition is less 
problematic in places where housing price risk is less problematic. Thus our model predicts that 
mobility of owners should be higher in housing price risky areas but mobility of renters should be 
the reverse- that is mobility will be higher among renters in the non-risky areas.  
 
3.c Changes in the Number of Rooms 
In addition to changing ownership status—the most commonly used measure of 
downsizing—another form may involve selling an existing home and buying a new one that is 
spatially smaller or constitute less housing consumption in other ways. One definition of 
objective home size available in all our data sets is the number of rooms. Using the PSID for 
those ages fifty or more, Table 6 examines changes in the number of rooms of the primary 
dwelling among those who changed residences between the waves of the data. These patterns are 
presented by type of area (whether a risky price area or not), initial type of housing tenure (owner 
or renter), and three time durations between the PSID waves—two, five, and ten years. 
These data indicate convincingly that among older Americans once they decide to relocate 
that they do tend to move into a smaller dwelling. On average, the new house is around 0.7 of a 
room smaller than the prior one, a scaling down of about 16% using rooms as the metric. This 
tendency to downsize is almost entirely due to a movement to smaller places among those who 
were initially homeowners. Moreover, most of that reduction in size is due to those who change 
in housing tenure from owner to renter—a new rental dwelling that is on average two and a third 
rooms smaller than the prior owned one. But—especially as the duration between the waves of 
the PSID increases—even those who remain homeowners purchase a new home that is on 
average about one third of a room smaller.    20
At least in these univariate descriptive statistics, this tendency of Americans home owners to 
downsize their house at older ages appears to be somewhat stronger if they originally lived in a 
risky housing price area. This is especially the case amongst those home owners who sell and 
then buy another home. Using the ten year interval horizon, the change in the number of rooms is 
twice as high in the risky areas when homeowners buy another home. In non-risky areas, there is 
little difference in size of dwelling among renters but renters do appear to downsize in the risky 
area. 
One limitation of the PSID is that sample sizes become thin once one stratifies by age. 
Tables 7 and 8 list similar data on the changing number of rooms associated with housing 
mobility for two HRS cohorts where relatively long horizons are possible to track housing 
changes. Table 7 provides data from the original HRS cohort (those 51-61 years old in 1992) 
while Table 8 does the same for the AHEAD cohort (those 70+ years old in 1993.) These two 
cohorts are of particular interest since the first captures transitions associated with the pre 
retirement years while the second focuses on the nature of post-retirement mobility.  
During the pre-retirement years, we do find a tendency of Americans to downsize, but this 
is concentrated completely on home owners and appears to be more pronounced in the price risky 
places. Over a ten year ten horizon, homeowners who lived in price risky areas when they moved 
reduced the size of their dwelling by 1.6 rooms if they became a renter and half a room on 
average if they remained a home owner. The comparable figures for those in less housing price 
risky areas were about a one room reduction if they became a renter and a .8 reduction if they 
remained a homeowner—about half as large as the amount of downsizing taking place among 
those living in the price risky areas. 
If anything these size reductions appear to be even larger in the post retirement AHEAD 
cohort who are examined in Table 8. Conditional on relocation, there is a tendency to move to a 
smaller place even if one remains a homeowner. This tendency is much stronger among those 
who initially resided in a place with a lot of housing price risk.   21
The comparable data on number of rooms for the sample ages fifty plus in Britain are 
contained in Table 9 based on data from the BHPS. Downsizing at older ages characterizes 
households in both countries although it is a less pervasive phenomenon in Britain than in the US. 
The term less pervasive applies not only to a smaller probability of changing residences at all at 
older ages in Britain, but also to a smaller change in the size of dwelling given that a move takes 
place. If we compare Tables 6 and 9, the changes in number of rooms are almost half as large in 
Britain compared to the US. The principal difference lies in the switch from owner to renter status 
where the reduction in number of rooms in Britain is 1.4 compared to 2.2 in the US. As was the 
case in America, the magnitude of the downsizing that takes place is somewhat larger in the 
housing price risky areas of Britain compared to places with more stable housing prices.  
3.d Escaping Housing Price Volatility 
Even when older householders remain home owners and stay in a home of approximately 
the same size, they can avoid some of the costs of housing price risk by moving to places where 
housing prices are less volatile. The data contained in tables 10.a (for the US) and 10.b (for 
Britain) indicate that this is precisely what takes place.  For those who moved,  these tables 
measure the difference in our measure of housing price risk (the standard deviation in housing 
prices) between the area where they originally lived and the area to which they moved. Thus, a 
positive negative number indicates that the area that they left was characterized by more housing 
price volatility than the area to which they moved—that is the household was reducing their 
exposure to housing price risk. In addition to age stratification, the data in Table 9 (based on the 
PSID) and Table 10 (based on the BHPS) are stratified by whether one was originally an owner 
or a renter and within each housing tenure type by the housing tenure type to which one moved. 
Additional data for the American sample based on the two HRS cohorts are provided in Appendix 
Table 1. In these tables, the American units of volatility were defined as ten times the British 
units.   22
There are a number of salient patterns, foremost of which is that after age 50 when they do 
move people move on average to a place with less housing price volatility. The tendency of 
Americans to move to less price volatile areas peaks during the dominant retirement years (ages 
60-69) and actually reverses after age 80. This may not be surprising since housing decisions at 
very old age may have more to do with attempts to provide care for the elderly when they become 
frailer. This would include moving to assisted living communities and to live with relatives. 
Second, as predicted by the theory, the tendency to move to areas with less price volatility 
is far more prevalent among homeowners than among renters. The difference for Americans in 
the pre and post standard deviation of housing prices is six times larger among homeowners 
compared to renters. Among homeowners, there is almost no change in volatility if the one 
changes status from being an owner to a renter but a very large one if one remains a homeowner. 
These data on the change in housing price volatility associated with a move are also arrayed 
by the length of the time transition between the surveys. The longer the time duration between the 
surveys the greater the difference in location specific price volatility associated with the move. 
This effect is particularly large among those who were originally in their fifties. In this age group, 
the longer the time duration examined the more likely the move is associated with the retirement 
decision, where other factors are less likely to play a major role. 
With this consideration in mind, Appendix Table 1 presents a similar array of data for two 
important cohorts in the HRS data. The first is the original HRS cohort, those who were 51-61 
years old in 1992. This cohort was largely in the immediate pre-retirement phrase of the life cycle 
when the survey began. The second is the AHEAD cohort, a random sample of individuals who 
were at least 70 years old in 1970. Most of these individuals were in the post-retirement phrase of 
life. Individuals in both cohorts tend to move to less price volatile locations when they do move, 
especially if they were originally homeowners and especially if they remain home owners after 
the move. However, the escaping of price volatility is much larger in the pre-retirement cohort 
especially as the duration of time between the survey snapshots increases. One reason that this   23
effect is smaller in the post retirement AHEAD cohort is that many of them have already moved 
after retirement to a less price volatile place. 
Table 10.b lists parallel numbers for Britain. Just as in the States, British citizens also tend 
to move to less volatile housing areas if they do decide to move, but on average the escape from 
volatility is less dramatic there than in the US.  In spite of this similarity, there are some 
important differences between the two countries as well. For example, the escape from volatility 
in Britain appears not to vary substantially by age and also appears to be as large among renters 
as among owners. 
4. Model Estimates 
We will estimate a number of empirical models that relate to the downsizing decisions at 
older ages. These models include the following for those who did change residences across the 
waves of the data (i.e., movers); the change in the number of rooms, the change in the price 
volatility of the location in which one lives, and the change in the value of the house (for those 
who remained home owners). Since these models condition on the decision to move, we also use 
the full sample to estimate a probit model of the decision to change residence (where our 
dependent variable takes a value of one if the individual moves) and the change in the number of 
rooms. Having these two models side by side allows us to distinguish between the effects of 
variables on the probability of moving and then conditional on that probability the probability that 
one downsizes housing. These models are also combined into a single model of downsizing at 
older ages. 
We include in all models the following sets of demographic variables—a set of five year 
age dummies beginning at ages 50-54 with those ages 80 and over the reference group, the 
change in the number of people living in the house, three marital status transitions (married-
single, single-married, single-single with married-married as the omitted group), and children 
living at home transitions (kids-no kids, no kids-kids, no kids-no kids with kids-kids as the   24
omitted group). The marital and child transition variables tell us, conditional on the changes in 
the number of residents, whether the type of resident matters. For example, one might suspect that 
children would matter more than spouses in these transitions since they might have a bigger 
impact on the number of rooms. Because not all transitions from married to single are the same, 
we also include a dummy variable for whether or not one became widowed across the waves. 
The probability of moving and hence the possibility of downsizing may be related to work 
transitions including retirement that take place at these ages. Therefore, a set of work transitions 
are included in these models (work-no work, no work-work, no work-no work with work-work as 
the omitted category). Unlike the demographic variables above which are common to the family 
unit, the work variables are individual level variables.  
The economic variables include the ln of real annual income and education, measured by 
years of schooling. In the United States education is separated into three groups—13-16 years of 
schooling, 16 or more years of schooling with 12 or fewer years the reference group. In Britain 
we construct broadly comparable groups based on educational qualifications—the lowest 
education (reference) group are those with compulsory schooling only, the middle group has 
some post-compulsory schooling or vocational qualifications but less than a college degree, and 
the final group has college degrees or higher.  
We also include a measure of baseline house value (for home owners only) and home 
equity and baseline housing price volatility. A linear time trend is part of all models. The data 
used for estimation are based a sample of individuals ages fifty and more using the PSID for the 
United States (for all years 1968-1999) and the BHPS for Britain (years 1993-2004
6).  
4.1 The Probability of Moving 
Tables 11.a (for the United States) and 11.b (for the United Kingdom) lists estimated 
derivatives and the associated z statistics obtained from probit models of the probability of 
                                                 
6 Although the BHPS sample began in 1991, data on house value was only collected for those who were 
interviewed at a new address in 1992. Since our models are based on differences, we effectively have data 
starting in 1993.   25
changing residence (leaving aside the issue of changing areas or locations for the time being). For 
each country, models are estimated across three time horizons—one, five, and ten years. 
If we examine first the set of transition variables included in the model (marriage, kids, and 
work), the reference group (married-married, kids-kids, and work-work) is generally the one least 
associated with residential mobility. Next in line tends to be the other category which also does 
not involve a transition between states over the time period under consideration (single-single, no 
kids-no kids, and no work-no work). The higher effect compared to the reference group may 
reflect lagged effects of transitions into the single, no kids, or no work states.  If a marriage 
transition did take place, the demographic one most likely to lead to higher residential mobility 
are from single to married. Compared to the transition from married to single of which it is a part, 
becoming widowed is less likely to result in mobility presumably since it is not necessary that 
somewhat move in this case. The impact of kids leaving home on mobility appears to be larger in 
the US than it is in Britain. The estimated magnitude of these demographic transitions effects do 
not change significantly with the time horizon over which the effects are estimated. The two work 
transitions are about equally likely to induce additional mobility in both countries. The results are 
generally remarkably similar in the two countries with the principal transitional difference taking 
place in the dimension of the kids at home variables.   
We next describe the estimated impacts of the economic variables included in the models. 
Several dimensions of economic resources are measured, including ln household income, 
education, whether or not one is initially a home owner, house value and home equity among 
home owners. Statistically significant positive education and income effects are estimated for 
both countries, effects that increase in size with the duration of the horizon. Given the stage of the 
life-cycle that we are examining, income is not a proxy for job market opportunities in alternative 
labor markets.  These are more likely income effects that capture the ability to finance moves and 
the ability to purchase amenities associated with localities that are no longer tied to jobs.   26
Consistent with the descriptive tables above, home owners in both countries are less mobile 
than renters even after controlling for this set of economic and demographic variables . However, 
conditional on being a home owner in both countries, mobility rises with the value of the house 
but declines with home equity when both variables are in the model.  One interpretation of the 
home value effect (in addition to the normal income effect mentioned above) is that as the value 
of home goes up people are consuming a lot of housing relative to their income inducing them to 
want to downsize their house. Conditional of the value of the house, and increase in home equity 
is equivalent to a reduction in the stock and flow of mortgage payments which makes it less likely 
that people move to reduce those payments. 
We estimate positive but statistically weak impacts of price volatility on mobility in 
Britain.  One reason for not being able to estimate volatility effects in Britain may be that there 
are much fewer years over which to estimate the volatility effect in Britain, a point which will 
become a theme in what follows. Particularly for the longer differences the time-series variation 
is extremely limited in the British sample—with 12 years of data we have t=2 for a ten-year 
difference—and since our identification of the volatility effects depends on time-series as well as 
regional variation there is only a very limited extent to which we could detect volatility effects.  
We estimate a negative effect of price volatility in the US, that is higher price volatility is 
associated with a lower probability of moving. As explained above, there is no unambiguous 
prediction of the effect of price volatility on the geographic mobility. On the one hand, higher 
price volatility should encourage owners to move in order to either downsize or escape the 
volatility. On the other hand, higher price volatility makes renters more constrained in their 
moves since they should not be eager to change their tenure status by buying a house. To test this 
idea, we ran separate models in the US for the ten year horizon for owners and renters. The 
estimated effect (derivative) of volatility on mobility was 0.001 (z= 3.26) for owners and -0.003 
(z= 5.92) for renters. These results also suggest that it more be more appropriate to estimate the   27
models on alternative forms of transitions (owners-owners, owners-renters, renters-owners, or 
renters- renters) for the predictions differ. 
Conditional on the attributes included in the model (which include incomes which will be 
growing with time), negative mobility time trends are estimated in the United States and no time 
trends in Britain. Finally, especially as the horizon expands to the ten year interval, we find that in 
the United States those ages 80 and over are the most mobile. This no doubt reflects the 
increasing necessity of moving into assisted living arrangements or moving in with relatives as 
individuals’ health deteriorates at very old age.  However, amongst the other age groups, those in 
their fifties are the most mobile with mobility falling until people are in their early seventies. In 
contrast, mobility in Britain is lowest amongst those eighty or more years old and peaks amongst 
those in their late fifties.  
4.2 The Change in the Number of Rooms—Movers 
The decision to move at older ages does not necessarily imply that downsizing of housing 
is occurring. For that to be true, those who do move would have to reduce their housing 
consumption in some form. The most direct quantitative measure of housing consumption 
available in both countries is the number of rooms per dwelling. Tables 12.a (for the United 
States) and 12.b (for Britain) list estimated coefficients and the associated t statistics obtained 
from OLS models of the change in the number of rooms per dwelling estimated across a sample 
of movers. Once again, models are estimated across three time horizons—one, five, and ten years. 
Demographic attributes of the household are not surprisingly strong predictors of the 
magnitude of housing demand. Reductions in the size of household (the dominant direction of 
change during this phrase of the life-cycle) are strongly associated with reductions in the number 
of rooms. The impact of people moving out also depends on the types of people who are leaving. 
In the United States, having no remaining children at home or having a spouse leave the home 
reduces the size of the house while entry does the opposite. In the United States, the difference   28
between spouses and no children are not all that large suggesting that this is not simply a 
bedroom effect. Lag effects of prior exit are no doubt operating as well since the no spouse-no 
spouse and no kid-no kid are both associated with reductions in the size of the dwelling. 
Conditional on changes in the number of household members, these demographic composition 
effects associated with children are much smaller and less consistent in Britain compared to the 
US.  Marriage effects are more similar in the two countries. 
However, while work transitions were strongly correlated with mobility in both countries, 
they have little impact on the size of dwelling unless they are also accompanied by demographic 
changes in the household structure. The extent of downsizing, at least as measured in this 
dimension, appears to increase with age in both countries. This age pattern becomes particularly 
steep after age 70 when the evidence appears to support reductions in housing consumption with 
age.  
Moreover, the age patterns of downsizing in housing consumption that occur are by and 
large independent of the other demographic and work transitions (marital status, work status, and 
kids at home status) in the sense that these estimated age patterns are about the same when all the 
demographic and work transitions are excluded from the model.  Thus, these age patterns lend 
support to the most basic prediction of the life-cycle model that at sufficiently old ages total 
consumption, of which housing is a very important part, will tend to decline. We return to this 
point again in section 5 below. 
Not only is higher household income associated with higher mobility at older ages it also is 
associated, particularly in Britain, with a reduced likelihood of reducing the size of the dwelling 
once one does move. Given the general desire to downsize at older ages, families in their present 
houses have more housing that they really need at this stage of their lives. Not downsizing puts 
the load on other forms of non- housing consumption to fall. Essentially the amenities of a ‘too 
large’ house (family memories, associations with old neighbors etc) can be thought of as a luxury 
good, which the more well- to- do are more able to afford.    29
In the US, there is limited evidence of a net impact of education on the size of the house 
with some tendency for less educated British households to downsize more, even conditional on 
their lower incomes. Increases in the value of the initial owned home tends to lead to a larger 
decrease in the size of the dwelling suggesting that when a lot of resources are tied up in the 
house, there is a greater tendency to downsize at older ages. The same is true when one has a lot 
of equity in the home although this effect is only found in Britain at the ten year horizon. 
In the United States, consistent with the theory outlined above, living in a more price 
volatile area does encourage additional downsizing among those who do move. There appears to 
be little effect in Britain although one obtains the expected negative point estimate of the effect at 
the ten year horizon, albeit only with a t-value of 1.5. 
4.3 The Change in the Number of Rooms—Full Sample 
In the previous two sections, we estimated separate models for the probability of changing 
residences at older ages and the change in the number of moves conditioned on being a mover. 
The advantage of the two part model is that we can more easily detect whether variables have 
differential effects on mobility and the consequences of that mobility for housing consumption. 
We have already seen that in a number of cases the estimated effects are even of different sign. In 
this section, we ignore that separation by estimating the effect of co-variates on the changing 
number of rooms over the full sample of respondents. Since most people in fact do not move at 
all at older ages, these estimated effects will of course be necessarily smaller. 
Not surprisingly, the estimated impacts of demographic variables resemble those estimated 
over the mover sample but at much diminished magnitude. The size of these demographic 
associated with family related transitions tends to increase with the time duration of the window 
in which a move can take place. In both countries, the transition from married to single is 
associated with a smaller dwelling, while the reverse is true when people change from the single 
life to a married one. Two differences between the two countries in the impact of the   30
demographic transitions are first that widowhood has no impact on the size of the house in Britain 
while it tends to reduce the number of rooms in the US.  Second, the transitions associated with 
children appear to have no effect in Britain but kids leaving home do promote some downsizing 
in the US.   The only consistent impact of work transitions on the size of the dwelling in either 
country is that the transition from work to no work (presumably during these ages mostly 
retirement) leads to a smaller house.    
Higher incomes strongly discourage downsizing in both countries with somewhat larger 
estimated impacts in Britain. This implies that the increase in probability of moving is offset the 
fact the move is less likely to reduce the size of the dwelling. Across the full sample, higher home 
values encourage downsizing in the US but there is no effect in Britain. Home equity appears to 
have little impact in either country. Once again the estimated patterns with age indicate that 
housing consumption does decline with age, a decline that cannot be explained by the other 
demographic and work transitions included in these models. These adjusted age patterns of 
downsizing appear to be larger in the US than they are in Britain.  On net, higher housing price 
volatility encourages downsizing in US with statistically significant effects in Britain. 
 
 
4.4 Changes in House Price 
 
  In addition to the number of rooms, the other dimension of housing consumption that we 
can measure in both countries is the change in the value of the house among those who move.   
By necessity, the sample over which these models are estimated are homeowners who moved but 
who remained home owners. These models are presented in Tables 14.a (for the US) and 14.b 
(for Britain). In order to control for any state or region wide capital gains in housing, these 
models include two additional variables that are not in the change in rooms equation. The first is 
the percent change in the real price of housing in the state of origin over the horizon used in the 
regression (measured as the delta in the geometric means) and the second is whether or not one 
changed state of residence when a move took place. Not surprisingly, individual level changes in   31
house values when people move are positively correlated with area wide real housing price 
changes. 
  A useful comparison is to compare the results for the two dimensions of downsizing- 
change in number of rooms amongst movers (Table 12) and change in home price (Table 14). 
Taking into account that sample sizes are much smaller in the model for the change in ln home 
value specification the results for the US are generally similar but statistically weaker than for the 
change in number of rooms. In particular, becoming single or having the final child leave home, 
and more generally reductions in the number of people living in the household, are all associated 
with a move to a less expensive home. There is little association of the value of the home with 
any of the work transitions.  Most important, volatility at baseline has the expected negative 
coefficient in both the change in rooms and change in ln home value models but it is less 
statistically significant in the home value specification. Perhaps, the biggest difference is that 
income effects are much weaker in the change in home value model in the US. If anything the 
results in Britain are weaker still where we encounter a lack of precision on our estimates of the 
volatility terms and weaker income effects than in the model for the change in rooms.  
  
4.5 Reducing price volatility  
 
We have argued that, from an exposure to house price risk point of view, one alternative 
to downsizing is to protect your assets in housing by moving to a less price volatile housing area. 
Tables 15.a and 15.b model the change in housing price volatility among movers for the US and 
Britain respectively. The outcome variable is measured as current housing price volatility minus 
volatility in the new location, so that positive values imply a movement to a less housing price 
volatile area. The same set of variables that entered the room downsizing model are included in 
this model for escaping housing price volatility.  Examining first table 15.b, we can see 
immediately why it is so difficult to obtain an effect for housing price volatility in Britain. Given   32
the short time span over which models are estimated there, there is a very strong time trend in 
volatility that dominates everything else included in the model.  Conditional on this trend, (where 
price volatility is increasing over time), there are little remaining systematic associations with 
price volatility in Britain. 
Given the longer number of years available for analysis coupled with more systematic 
and larger differences between the volatile and less volatile areas, more interesting results were 
obtained for the US model summarized in Table 15.a.  A positive coefficient in these models 
indicates that a variable is associated with moving to an even less price volatile area. To begin 
with we see that many of the demographic transition variables associated with other forms of 
downsizing are also important here.  Most importantly, the transition of the last child leaving 
home is associated with a greater tendency to move to a less housing price volatile area, and those 
families whose children have already left home (the kids-no kids group) are also more likely to 
search out a less price volatile area than those whose children remain in the home Once again, we 
interpret this as a lagged effect of children leaving home prior to the baseline year since the 
subsequent decision to relocate may not be instantaneous. Second, those households who either 
are retired or who become retired are also likely to reduce the housing volatility associated with 
the place where they decide to reside by more.  
In contrast to some of the other measures, however, we do not find significant effects of 
changes in marital status or widowhood, even over the longest time-period horizons. Finally, we 
find contrasting education and income effects that are somewhat hard to interpret—conditional on 
income, the more educated are less likely to reduce their house price volatility which is somewhat 
of a puzzle, although the effect of income would be to offset this unconditionally, since those 
with higher incomes tend to reduce their house price volatility by more. Since the age coefficients 
tend to become less positive after age groups 55-59 and 60-64, the tendency to seek out places in 
less volatile areas peaks in that age group. 
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5. Consumption Trajectories at Older Ages 
One of the more hotly debated issues regarding life-cycle patterns of consumption with age 
concerns whether households reduce their consumption at older ages. The importance of the 
debate stems in part from the fact that it is a basic implication of the life-cycle model that such 
consumption declines should occur in part due to rising rates of age specific mortality at older 
ages. There are of course other reasons for consumption to fall with age particularly related to the 
shrinking of households as children leave home and widowhood becomes more common. Thus, 
the question is ask is whether consumption declines in addition to any changes induced by a set of 
demographic changes producing smaller households and the decision to retire from the labor 
force.  Housing is an important component of total consumption and is believed to one of the 
resistant to any downward changes. Thus, we argue that evidence showing a downward path of 
housing consumption adds important evidence to this debate.  
To provide such evidence, Figure 2.a plots the change in the number of rooms across age 
bands that is estimated in the models for movers in Table 12.a and Table 12.b. Figure 2.b 
provides similar plots except in this case the sample consists of all households whether or not 
they change residence (i.e. the models estimated in Table 13.a and Table 13.b).For the purposes 
of these plots, we used the models estimated over the five year horizon. The declines in housing 
consumption documented in this section would be even larger if we used instead estimates 
obtained from the ten year horizon. For both Figures 2.a and 2.b, we plot the estimated age 
trajectories obtained whilst controlling for other transitions between waves (i.e. the models in 
Tables 12 and 13 respectively), and also the trajectories estimated from a more restricted model 
with the demographic and employment status transition variables excluded. In each country the 
changes are normalized around the value for the 50-54 age group in the models without any 
controls for demographic and work transitions.    34
Figure 2.a demonstrates that there exists in both countries a clear decline in housing 
consumption (as measured by the change in the number of rooms) for movers, a decline that 
appears to accelerate after age 65. Except for very old ages (ages 75 and older) this decrease in 
housing consumption appears to be roughly similar in both countries. After age 75, the decrease 
in the number of rooms is clearly larger in the United States presumably reflecting the decline in 
the number of rooms associated with widowhood in the US and the absence of any such 
association in Britain. These declines in housing consumption are not trivial- about one room in 
the US and a half a room in Britain. 
If we control for the other demographic and work transitions and all other covariates 
included in the models in Tables 12.a and 12.b, the age patterns are very much the same 
indicating declining housing consumption with age in both countries of about the same order of 
magnitude. This indicates that the age patterns of declining housing consumption that we 
document are not the result of either work or family transitions that are associated with aging. 
The age patterns that are plotted in Figure 2.b for all households (independent of whether 
they move or not over the five year horizon) dramatize a much larger difference between the two 
countries. In particular, the decline in housing consumption with age across this more relevant 
sample of all households is clearly much larger in the US than it is in Britain. The decline in 
number of rooms with age is a little less than half a room in the US and about one twentieth of a 
room in Britain. The principal reason for the differences between Figures 2.a and 2.b is that 
households are much less mobile in Britain than in the US.  
Our results indicate that housing consumption appears to decline with age in the US, even 
after controlling for the other demographic and work transitions associated with age that would 
normally produce such a decline. No such fall in housing consumption is found in Britain, largely 
because British households are much more likely to stay in their original residence. The important 
question that cannot be answered with data on housing alone is whether these results indicate a 
more general tendency of less reduction in total household consumption in Britain compared to   35
the US at older ages.  The alternative possibility is that the British adjust their non-housing 
consumption downward more than American households do so that the patterns of total 
household consumption with age are similar.   
There may of course be other transitions, not controlled for in our analysis, driving the 
downwards trajectories observed . The principal candidates for transitions that are correlated with 
age and not accounted for in our models would be health related.  Health conditions are not 
measured well in either the PSID or the BHPS and we will consider them instead in future work 
that uses the HRS and ELSA panels. Declines in health in old age are of course closely related to 
the principal factor (rising mortality risk) emphasized in life-cycle models that produces the 
decline in consumption so that it may be  difficult to disentangle these effects in practice.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined and modeled several types of housing transitions of the 
elderly in two countries—Britain and the United States.  One important form of these transitions 
involves downsizing of housing consumption, the importance of which among older households 
is still debated. We find that on balance—looking over a number of dimensions over a number of 
transition intervals - downsizing is an important part of life for many older households in both 
countries. For example over a decade, almost one in every three American home owners who 
were at least fifty years old moved out of an their originally owned home. And mobility is much 
higher in both countries (and in particular in the US) amongst renters. Moreover when they do 
move we find that on average, households in both countries tend to downsize their housing 
consumption. This downsizing takes multiple forms, including reductions in the number of rooms 
per dwelling and the value of the home. There is also evidence that this downsizing is greater 
when house price volatility is greater and in addition, that American households also try to escape   36
housing price volatility by moving to places that are experience significantly less housing price 
volatility. 
Our comparative evidence in the descriptive tables in Section 3 also suggests that there is 
less evidence of downsizing in Britain than in the US, although a note of caution is appropriate 
here because we have a considerably smaller samples and a different (and shorter) time period in 
Britain. Nevertheless, given differences in house price volatility across the countries this is a 
result that is, on the surface, contrary to the predictions of our simple theoretical discussion. 
Looking within country, however, we find the expected positive correlation between volatility 
and downsizing (although this correlation is weaker in Britain where we have less variation in 
volatility to exploit). This in turn suggests that other factors must account for the differences in 
the average levels of downsizing across the two countries. Possible candidates would include the 
role of lower mobility in general in Britain. Whilst this is only an incomplete explanation since 
mobility is itself an outcome measure and one indicator of downsizing, if households are moving 
less often (and their children and grandchildren are also less likely to move) then there will be 
less downsizing to the extent that the number of rooms and a reduction in house value only 
change on moving.  
Hence, other explanations might lie in transactions costs associated with moving in 
Britain (where stamp duties are levied on house sales and the fixed costs associated with house 
sales are both high and somewhat uncertain), the nature of bequests and inheritance tax bases and 
the role of housing wealth in other economic institutions such as the means test for long-term 
care. However, such mechanisms are unlikely to be the full explanation since mobility in Britain 
is particularly low amongst renters. In addition, to the extent that retirement related mobility 
yields movements outside Britain—to Spain and France, as opposed to Florida and Arizona, for 
example - such transitions are not captured in our data although the empirical importance of such 
transitions in Britain is still likely to be relatively limited. Finally, it is certainly the case that even   37
in the least volatile regions of Britain there is still considerable volatility so the possibility of 
avoiding house price volatility altogether is somewhat limited. Such explanations should be 
considered as topics for future research.  
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Figure 1a: The demographic ladder, US 
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Table 1a 
Tenure Status for Individuals by Age of Head, US 
 
  50-59 60-69 70-79 80+  Total 
          
Owner 83.0  83.1  77.5  65.5  80.5 
          
Renter 15.0  14.6  19.2  28.8  16.7 
          
Other 1.9  2.3  2.5  6.7  2.8 
Risky Areas 
          
Owner 77.2  74.9  68.4  57.4  73.7 
          
Renter 21.2  22.9  29.9  36.1  24.4 
          
Other 1.6  2.2  1.7  4.6  2.0 
Non- Risky Areas 
          
Owner 85.1  85.8  79.9  68.3  81.8 
          
Renter 11.8  12.8  16.2  26.2  14.2 
          
Other 2.2  2.4  3.9  7.4  3.0 
   Source:  PSID—(1968-1999), weighted individual level data. 
 
Table 1b 
Tenure Status for Individuals by Age of Head of Family, UK 
 
  50-59 60-69 70-79 80+  Total 
          
Owner 76.5  71.0  63.2  48.2  67.6 
          
Renter 19.7  25.3  31.8  42.5  27.5 
          
Other 3.8  3.7  5.1  9.3  4.9 
Risky Areas 
          
Owner 78.7  74.7  66.2  50.6  70.5 
          
Renter 17.4  21.9  29.2  39.4  24.7 
          
Other 3.9  3.4  4.7  10.1  4.8 
Non- Risky Areas 
          
Owner 72.3  64.0  57.8  43.5  62.2 
          
Renter 24.2  31.7  36.5  48.6  32.8 
          
Other 3.5  4.3  5.8  7.9  4.9 
   Source:  BHPS—(1991-2004), weighted individual level data.   44
Table 2 
Housing Transition among Owners in the United States and in the United Kingdom 
Two-Year Transitions 
United States 
 All  Risky  Non-Risky 
Owner, Owner, No move  88.9  89.4  88.7 
Owner, Owner, Moved  8.0  7.7  8.1 
Owner,  Renter  2.2 2.3 2.1 
Owner,  Other  0.9 0.6 1.0 
United Kingdom 
Owner, Owner, No move  94.0  93.7  94.8 
Owner, Owner, Moved  4.2  4.5  3.5 
Owner,  Renter  1.2 1.2 1.2 
Owner,  Other  0.6 0.6 0.5 
Five-Year Transitions 
United States 
Owner, Owner, No move  80.0  79.8  80.1 
Owner, Owner, Moved  14.3  14.7  14.1 
Owner,  Renter  4.2 4.4 4.2 
Owner,  Other  1.5 1.1 1.6 
 
United Kingdom   
Owner, Owner, No move  86.5  86.1  87.3 
Owner, Owner, Moved  10.7  11.2  9.6 
Owner,  Renter  2.1 2.0 2.3 
Owner,  Other  0.7 0.7 0.8 
Ten-Year Transitions 
United States 
Owner, Owner, No move  68.2  65.6  69.0 
Owner, Owner, Moved  22.7  26.0  21.7 
Owner,  Renter  6.8 6.5 6.9 
Owner,  Other  2.3 1.8 2.5 
United Kingdom 
Owner, Owner, No move  76.1  75.6  77.3 
Owner, Owner, Moved  20.2  20.8  19.0 
Owner,  Renter  2.8 2.6 3.0 
Owner,  Other  0.9 1.0 0.7 
   Source:  US data based on PSID for all years 1968-1999⎯Population ages 50+. UK data are 
based on BHPS. All data are weighted and are individual level data. 
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Table 3 
Housing Transitions among Renters in the United States and in the United Kingdom 
 
 
 All  Risky  Non-Risky 
Two-Year Transitions 
United States 
Renter, Renter, No move  61.1  68.5  56.8 
Renter, Renter, Moved  27.0  22.7  29.4 
Renter, Owner  9.8  6.8  10.2 
Renter,  Other  3.0 2.0 3.6 
United Kingdom 
Renter, Renter, No move  88.2  87.9  90.1 
Renter, Renter, Moved  6.6  7.5  5.4 
Renter,  Owner  4.0 4.0 3.9 
Renter,  Other  0.6 0.7 0.6 
Five-Year Transitions 
United States 
Renter, Renter, No move  59.0  64.6  56.3 
Renter, Renter, Moved  28.5  26.8  29.3 
Renter,  Owner  8.4 6.7 9.2 
Renter,  Other  4.1 1.9 5.2 
United Kingdom 
Renter, Renter, No move  76.6  75.3  78.5 
Renter, Renter, Moved  14.3  15.7  12.3 
Renter,  Owner  8.0 7.8 8.3 
Renter,  Other  1.1 1.2 0.9 
Ten-Year Transitions 
United States 
Renter, Renter, No move  28.2  37.1  22.5 
Renter, Renter, Moved  43.5  39.5  46.0 
Renter,  Owner  24.2 20.9 26.2 
Renter,  Other  4.2 2.5 5.2 
United Kingdom 
Renter, Renter, No move  59.8  58.7  61.4 
Renter, Renter, Moved  24.1  24.7  23.4 
Renter,  Owner  14.6 14.8 14.2 
Renter,  Other  1.4 1.8 1.0 
   Source:  US data based on PSID for all years 1968-1999⎯Population ages 50+. UK data are 
based on BHPS. All data are weighted and are individual level data.   46
Table 4  
Housing Transition among Owners by Age of Head (of family)—Ten Year Transitions 
 
  50-59 60-69 70-79  80  plus 
United States 
Owner, Owner, No move  70.8  70.2  62.9  42.8 
Owner, Owner, Moved  24.5  20.6  15.5  12.9 
Owner, Renter  3.6  6.3  12.2  38.0 
Owner, Other   1.1  2.9  5.8  6.3 
Risky Areas 
Owner, Owner, No move  64.5  65.7  74.9  46.9 
Owner, Owner, Moved  29.2  25.4  10.9  18.6 
Owner, Renter  4.8  7.5  10.9  25.5 
Owner,  Other  1.6 1.5  3.4   9.0 
Non-Risky Areas 
Owner, Owner, No move  70.8  70.2  62.9  42.8 
Owner, Owner, Moved  24.5  20.6  15.2  12.9 
Owner, Renter  3.6  6.3  16.2  38.0 
Owner, Other  1.1  2.9  5.8  6.3 
United Kingdom 
Owner, Owner, No move  73.5  74.0  81.1  79.0 
Owner, Owner, Moved  24.2  22.9  15.2  11.8 
Owner, Renter  1.7  1.9  3.2  7.1 
Owner, Other  0.6  1.1  0.6  2.1 
 
Risky Areas 
Owner, Owner, No move  73.2  73.5  81.1  76.1 
Owner, Owner, Moved  24.7  23.2  15.3  13.9 
Owner, Renter  1.4  2.0  2.9  7.9 
Owner, Other  0.7  1.3  0.8  2.2 
Non-Risky Areas 
Owner, Owner, No move  74.1  75.3  80.8  84.5 
Owner, Owner, Moved  23.0  22.2  14.9  7.8 
Owner, Renter  2.5  1.7  3.9  5.7 
Owner, Other  0.4  0.7  0.3  2.1 
  
 
   Source:  US data based on PSID for all years 1968-1999⎯Population ages 50+. UK data are 
based on BHPS 1991-2004. All data are weighted are individual level data. 
. 
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Table 5 
Housing Transition among Renters by Age of Head—Ten Year Transitions 
 
 50-59  60-69  70-79  80  plus 
United States 
Renter, Renter, No move  21.6  31.1  41.4  26.9 
Renter, Renter, Moved  40.6  47.0  41.8  56.4 
Renter, Owner  33.3  17.1  12.0  8.2 
Renter, Other  4.6  2.9  4.9  8.4 
Risky Areas 
Renter, Renter, No move  30.7  39.4  51.7  37.3 
Renter, Renter, Moved  38.8  41.1  37.3  44.5 
Renter, Owner  27.5  18.5  8.0  8.4 
Renter,  Other  3.0 1.1  3.0   9.8 
Non Risky Areas 
Renter, Renter, No move  15.3  25.7  35.3  22.6 
Renter, Renter, Moved  41.9  50.7  44.4  61.1 
Renter, Owner  37.2  19.5  14.4  8.2 




Renter, Renter, No move  45.5  61.2  61.5  71.0 
Renter, Renter, Moved  27.0  23.6  25.5  20.3 
Renter, Owner  26.1  13.8  11.3  7.6 
Renter, Other  1.4  1.5  1.7  1.1 
Risky Areas 
Renter, Renter, No move  43.4  54.3  64.3  72.5 
Renter, Renter, Moved  26.0  24.6  27.7  19.5 
Renter, Owner  28.3  18.3  6.4  7.5 
Renter, Other  2.3  2.9  1.6  0.5 
Non Risky Areas 
Renter, Renter, No move    48.9  69.1  57.5  69.0 
Renter, Renter, Moved  28.5  22.4  22.2  21.3 
Renter, Owner  22.6  8.6  18.6  7.7 
Renter, Other  0.0  0.0  1.8  1.9 
 
   Source:  US data based on PSID for all years 1968-1999Population ages 50+. UK data are 
based on BHPS. All data are weighted are individual level data. 
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Table 6 
Change in Number of Rooms among movers—PSID ages 50+ by number of years 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  2 years  5 years  10 years 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
 
Owners   -0.574   -0.739   -0.817 
    Owners-renters   -2.016   -2.102   -2.149 
  Owners-new owners     -0.191    -0.319    -0.395 
     
Renters   -0.004   -0.084   -0.176 
  Renters-owners   0.692   0.639   0.631 




  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Owners   -0.776   -0.970   -0.992 
  Owners-renters    -2.219    -2.358    -2.670 
  Owners-new owners     -0.383    -0.558    -0.641 
     
Renters   -0.094   -0.211   -0.357 
  Renters-owners   0.336   0.413   0.348 
 Renters-new renters    -0.158    -0.339    -0.629 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Non- Risky Areas 
  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Owners   -0.517   -0.668   -0.756 
  Owners-renters    -1.943    -2.023    -2.114 
  Owners-new owners     -0.137    -0.242    -0.308 
     
Renters    0.034   -0.025   -0.078 
  Renters-owners   0.818   0.727   0.764 
 Renters-new renters    -0.158    -0.297    -0.470 
____________________________________________________________________ 
   Source:  PSID ages 50+—(1968-1999)—rooms limited to eight. All data are weighted are 
individual level data.   49
Table 7 
Change in Number of Rooms among movers- Original HRS Cohort by number of years 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  2 years  6 years  10 years 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
 
Owners   -0.298   -0.214   -0.796 
    Owners-renters   -1.276   -0.779   -1.191 
  Owners-new owners     -0.152    -0.134    -0.758 
     
Renters   0.310   0.149   0.323 
  Renters-owners   1.180   0.633   0.919 




  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Owners   -0.352   -0.234   -0.805 
    Owners-renters   -1.008   -0.659   -1.632 
  Owners-new owners     -0.268    -0.169    -0.668 
     
Renters   0.123   0.025    -0.054 
  Renters-owners   1.411   0.753   0.477 
  Renters-new  renters   -0.360   -0.442   -0.498 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Non- Risky Areas 
  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Owners   -0.250   -0.210   -0.793 
    Owners-renters   -1.348   -0.821   -0.996 
  Owners-new owners     -0.078    -0.124    -0.787 
     
Renters   0.381   0.204   0.537 
  Renters-owners   1.085   0.599   1.126 
  Renters-new  renters   -0.132   -0.084   -0.191 
     
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  HRS—original cohort ages 51-61—rooms unlimited. All data are weighted are 
individual level data. 
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Table 8 
Change in Number of Rooms among movers- HRS Ahead Cohort by number of years 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  2 years  4 years  8 years 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
 
Owners   -0.509   -0.578   -0.646 
    Owners-renters   -2.039   -1.829   -1.619 
  Owners-new owners     -0.231    -0.389    -0.507 
     
Renters    0.126   -0.073   -0.002 
  Renters-owners   0.748   0.636   0.951 




  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Owners   -0.789   -0.800   -0.807 
    Owners-renters   -2.695   -2.001   -2.362 
  Owners-new owners     -0.242    -0.489    -0.387 
     
Renters   0.178   0.174   0.166 
  Renters-owners   1.054   1.352   1.041 
  Renters-new  renters   -0.261   -0.405   -0.540 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Non- Risky Areas 
  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Owners   -0.424   -0.508   -0.592 
    Owners-renters   -1.848   -1.731   -1.434 
  Owners-new owners     -0.228    -0.355    -0.554 
     
Renters    0.105   -0.171   -0.091 
  Renters-owners   0.586   0.361   0.872 
  Renters-new  renters   -0.311   -0.485   -0.167 
     
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  HRS—Ahead Cohort—rooms unlimited. All data are weighted and are 
individual level data. 
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Table 9 
Change in Number of Rooms among Movers—UK (BHPS) by Number of Years 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  2 years  5 years  10 years 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
 
Owners -0.629  -0.586  -0.449 
  Owners-renters  -0.558  -1.176  -1.442 
  Owners-owners   -0.876  -0.472  -0.314 
      
Renters -0.396  -0.486  -0.442 
 Renters-owners  -0.036  -0.103  -0.019 




  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Owners -0.683  -0.613  -0.466 
  Owners-renters  -0.861  -1.286  -1.593 
  Owners-owners   -0.636  -0.493  -0.322 
      
Renters -0.433  -0.502  -0.456 
 Renters-owners  0.048  0.079  0.105 
 Renters-renters  -0.695  -0.792  -0.795 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Non- Risky Areas 
  Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Delta # of 
rooms 
Owners -0.484  -0.521  -0.293 
  Owners-renters  -0.906  -0.964  -1.140 
  Owners-owners   -0.335  -0.416  -0.409 
      
Renters -0.333  -0.461  -0.421 
 Renters-owners  -0.158  -0.345  -0.195 
 Renters-renters  -0.460  -0.541  -0.560 
     
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  BHPS—rooms unlimited. All data are weighted and are individual level data. 
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Table 10.a 
Differences in Housing Price Volatility by State in USA among Movers by Age Group 
Two year transitions 
________________________________________________________________ 
 50-59  60-69  70-79  80+  Total 
 
All  owners  who  move   0.055   0.065  -0.007    -0.008  0.044 
  Owner to renter    0.074    0.062    0.003    0.005  0.017 
  Owner to owner    0.064    0.070    -0.017    0.003  0.053 
          
All  renters  who  move   0.020   0.062  0.032    -0.002  0.033 
  Renter to renter    0.009    0.055    0.017    0.002  0.023 
  Renter to owner    0.054    0.097    .0145    0  0.074 
          
All  movers   0.042   0.062  0.008    -0.005  0.038 
 
Five year transitions 
 
 50-59  60-69  70-79  80+  Total 
 
All  owners  who  move   0.090   0.072  0.014   -0.010  0.066 
  Owner to renter    0.047    -0.025    0.006    -0.014  0.011 
  Owner to owner    0.096    0.095    0.009    -0.075  0.081 
          
All  renters  who  move   0.033   0.104  0.048   -0.000  0.055 
  Renter to renter    0.011    0.072    0.025    -0.014  0.032 
  Renter to owner    0.073    0.199    0.163    -0.008  0.116 
          
All  movers   0.070   0.078  0.027   -0.004  0.060 
 
Ten year transitions 
 
 50-59  60-69  70-79  80+  Total 
 
All  owners  who  move  0.152  0.067   0.011    -0.023  0.102 
  Owner to renter    0.118    -0.029    0.029    -0.041  0.030 
  Owner to owner    0.160    0.094    0.013    0.193  0.127 
          
All  renters  who  move  0.058  0.103   0.108    -0.097  0.074 
  Renter to renter    0.027    0.048    0.111    -0.103  0.043 
  Renter to owner    0.102    0.252    0.084    -0.187  0.138 
          
All  movers   0.121  0.075   0.038    -0.016  0.091 
PSID Ages 50+ 1968-1999 
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Table 10b 
Differences in Housing Price Volatility by State among Movers by Age group, UK 
(BHPS) 
 
Two year transitions 
________________________________________________________________ 
 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+  Total
 
All owners who move  0.015 0.020 0.014 0.018  0.016
  Owner to renter  0.020 0.018 0.015 0.023  0.019
  Owner to owner  0.014 0.021 0.013 0.011  0.016
          
All renters who move  0.014 0.020 0.025 0.020  0.019
  Renter to renter  0.014 0.022 0.028 0.022  0.021
  Renter to owner  0.015 0.016 0.019 0.017  0.016
          
All movers  0.015 0.020 0.019 0.019  0.017
 
Five year transitions 
 
 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+  Total
All owners who move  0.036 0.038 0.035 0.041  0.037
  Owner to renter  0.056 0.039 0.028 0.056  0.045
  Owner to owner  0.034 0.038 0.037 0.026  0.035
          
All renters who move  0.028 0.037 0.045 0.028  0.035
  Renter to renter  0.030 0.042 0.044 0.039  0.038
  Renter to owner  0.027 0.026 0.046 0.006  0.029
          
All movers  0.033 0.038 0.040 0.035  0.036
 
Ten year transitions 
 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+  Total
All owners who move  0.076 0.079 0.076 0.086  0.078
  Owner to renter  0.087 0.087 0.068 0.096  0.085
  Owner to owner  0.075 0.079 0.078 0.080  0.077
          
All renters who move  0.077 0.069 0.069 0.069  0.072
  Renter to renter  0.078 0.073 0.070 0.071  0.073
  Renter to owner  0.075 0.063 0.066 0.066  0.069
          
All movers  0.076 0.077 0.073 0.078  0.076
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 11.a 
Probit Models of the Probability of Moving Between Waves—Unites States 
Horizon 
 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  df/dx t  df/dx t  df/dx t 
 
Education  13-15  baseline  .027 6.81  .035 5.31  .042 4.37 
Education >  16  baseline  .021 5.16  .044 6.41  .043 4.45 
Year at baseline  -.001  7.69  -.004  12.98  -.007  13.00 
Age  50-54  .036 6.16  .010 0.91  -.090 3.65 
Age  55-59  .020 3.54  -.019 1.69  -.118 4.86 
Age  60-64  .004 0.81  -.036 3.30  -.129 5.38 
Age  65-69  -.006 1.03  -.062 5.79  -.157 6.68 
Age  70-74  -.013 2.37  -.055 4.95  -.158 6.59 
Age  75-79  -.013 2.10  -.073 6.10  -.150 5.85 
ln income at baseline  .007  5.04  .011  3.81  .018  4.08 
Volatility  at  baseline  -.001 5.38  -.001 3.43  -.000 0.98 
Married/single  .149 13.54  .164 16.55  .144 12.21 
Single/married  354 16.63  .343 17.88  .331 13.59 
Single/single  .025 7.44  .060 9.21  .065 6.63 
Became  widowed  -.007 2.13  -.016 2.45  .001 0.06 
Kids/no  kids  .085 11.02  .085 11.69  .106 11.72 
No  kids/kids  .110  9.82 .144  10.49 .125  6.91 
No  kids/no  kids  .038 14.97  .087 17.39  .113 13.95 
Change in household size  -.002  0.84  -.004  1.55  .004  1.54 
Work/not  work  .063 10.65  .075 12.03  .057  7.72 
Not  work/work  .057 7.21  .072 5.55  .102 4.79 
Not  work/not  work  .028 9.67  .047 9.11  .067 8.47 
Owner  -.396 20.81  -.506 21.82  -.548 20.12 
ln house value (baseline)  .033  11.11  .042  8.56  .047  6.88 
ln home equity (baseline)  -.051  20.89  -.061  14.71  -.055  9.47 
(Have negative home equity)  -.149  16.33  -.208  12.82  -.197  8.44   55
Table 11.b 
Probit Models of the Probability of Moving Between Waves—United Kingdom 
Horizon 
 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  df/dx t  df/dx t  df/dx t 
 
Education—com  sch  leaver  .012 3.46  .048 5.48  .085 4.41 
Education—A  levels  .001 0.43  .027 3.46  .046 2.60 
Year  at  baseline  .001 2.01  .001 0.87  .004 0.69 
Age  50-54  .013 2.97  .064 5.18  .075 2.68 
Age  55-59  .012 2.81  .058 4.94  .092 3.51 
Age  60-64  .003 0.69  .034 3.03  .042 1.73 
Age  65-69  -.005 1.38  .026 2.38  .019 0.80 
Age  70-74  -.007 1.99  .002 0.22  .025 1.13 
Age  75-79  -.003 0.89  -.002 0.20  .022 0.97 
ln income at baseline  .000  0.09  .010  2.16  .020  1.92 
Volatility  at  baseline  .035 1.17  .084 1.03  .242 1.53 
Married/single  .175  7.69 .294  11.01 .241  5.56 
Single/married  .262 10.66  .342 12.12  .232  5.43 
Single/single  .005 2.08  .020 3.27  -.001 0.04 
Became  widowed  -.029 4.65  -.099 5.84  -.144 3.81 
Kids/no  kids  .015 1.55  -.020 1.52  -.072 2.54 
No  kids/kids  .023 1.16  .012 0.29  .060 0.81 
No  kids/no  kids  .005 1.19  -.010 0.86  -.063 2.03 
Change in household size  .003  1.42  .005  1.31  .012  1.71 
Work/not  work  .039 6.83  .052 5.79  .077 4.35 
Not  work/work  .025 3.47  .054 3.46  .061 1.87 
Not  work/not  work  .008 3.16  .020 2.64  .030 1.66 
Owner  -.036 3.32  -.081 3.15  -.077 1.47 
ln house value (baseline)  .015  3.73  .050  5.54  .039  2.14 
ln home equity (baseline)  -.013  3.96  -.051  7.27  -.051  3.24 
(Have negative home equity)  -.027  2.58  -.076  2.48  -.095  1.37 
 
  
   56
Table 12.a 
Models of Changes in Number of Rooms Between Waves—United States—Movers 
Horizon 
 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t 
 
Education  13-15  baseline  .048 0.95  .065 1.39  .069 1.38 
Education >  16  baseline  .055 0.97  .097 1.98  .115 2.21 
Year  at  baseline  -.001 0.41  -.008 3.65  -.008 2.80 
Age  50-54  .521  6.95  1.023 13.40  1.413 12.82 
Age  55-59  .455  6.15  1.039 13.84  1.399 12.80 
Age  60-64  .526  7.59  1.018 13.66  1.247 11.44 
Age  65-69  .486 6.47  .842  11.08  1.059 9.58 
Age  70-74  .373 4.69  .672 8.47  .675 5.85 
Age  75-79  .347 3.98  .328 3.68  .291 2.30 
ln income at baseline  .079  4.34  .124  6.47  .121  5.56 
Volatility  at  baseline  -.006 2.89  -.011 6.23  -.016 8.40 
Married/single  -.649 7.06  -.478 8.72  -.565  10.60 
Single/married  .248 2.22  .483 5.90  .479 5.51 
Single/single  -.210 4.84  -.319 7.76  -.445 9.68 
Became  widowed  -.050 1.10  -.032 0.81  .019 0.47 
Kids/no  kids  -.592  7.14  -.588 11.48  -.718 14.28 
No  kids/kids  .352 3.22  .348 4.18  .600 6.61 
No  kids/no  kids  -.119 3.13  -.324 8.61  -.529  11.84 
Change in household size  .310  12.74  .304  21.03  .267  19.83 
Work/not  work  .068 1.02  -.031 0.76  .025 0.62 
Not  work/work  -.026 0.28  .070 0.83  .014 0.13 
Not  work/not  work  .067 1.76  .094 2.59  .048 1.16 
Owner  -.026 0.19  .131 1.00  .565 3.93 
ln house value (baseline)  -.150  4.59  -.204  6.50  -.298  8.68 
ln home equity (baseline)  -.068  2.48  -.070  2.57  -.008  0.27 
(Have negative home equity)  -.294  2.62  -.202  1.82  .032  0.26 
Constant  -.538 2.38  -1.178 5.06 -1.483    5.49 
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Table 12.b 
Models of Changes in Number of Rooms Between Waves—United Kingdom—Movers 
Horizon 
 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t 
 
Education—com  sch  leaver  -.292 1.72  -.130 1.32  -.171 1.30 
Education—A  levels  -.046 0.27  .180 1.90  .098 0.76 
Year  at  baseline  .039 1.89  .019 0.91  -.063 1.19 
Age  50-54  .460 1.84  .559 3.58  1.332 6.50 
Age  55-59  .388 1.63  .649 4.32  .879 4.55 
Age  60-64  -.117 0.48  .322 2.16  .912 4.83 
Age  65-69  -.170 0.69  .439 2.96  .708 3.71 
Age  70-74  -.043 0.17  .154 1.02  .573 3.19 
Age  75-79  -.036 0.14  .032 0.21  .654 3.56 
ln income at baseline  .434  4.83  .230  4.05  .296  3.76 
Volatility  at  baseline  .954 0.53  .406 0.37  -1.882 1.52 
Married/single  -.250 0.63  -.281 1.51  -.495 2.04 
Single/married  .381 1.25  .640 3.82  .856 4.01 
Single/single  .062 0.50  -.055 0.69  .048 0.43 
Became  widowed  .460 0.71  .860 3.17  1.415 4.29 
Kids/no  kids  -.164 0.37  -.164 0.98  .112 0.53 
No  kids/kids  -.326 0.47  -.361 0.85  -.057 0.14 
No  kids/no  kids  -.212 0.84  -.530 3.76  -.420 2.08 
Change in household size  .643  8.12  .380  9.32  .498  9.94 
Work/not  work  -.252 1.19  -.231 2.24  .002 0.02 
Not  work/work  .560 1.93  -.029 0.17  .266 1.23 
Not  work/not  work  -.079 0.51  -.002 0.02  .113 0.83 
Owner  1.53 2.82  1.35 4.37  .875 2.41 
ln house value (baseline)  -.497  2.09  -.256  2.21  .071  0.59 
ln home equity (baseline)  .071  0.38  -.074  0.86  -.267  2.55 
(Have negative home equity)  .979  0.85  -.608  1.39  .081  0.16 
Constant  -4.644 4.89  -2.664 4.20  -2.652 2.44 
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Table 13.a 
Models of Changes in Number of Rooms Between Waves—United States—All 
Horizon 
 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t 
 
Education  13-15  baseline  .012 1.04  .024 1.38  .006 0.25 
Education >  16  baseline  .017 1.41  .045 2.54  .096 3.74 
Year  at  baseline  -.000 0.23  -.001 1.55  .002 1.21 
Age  50-54  .085  4.93 .433  13.96 .914  14.05 
Age  55-59  .076  4.49 .414  13.60 .890  13.76 
Age  60-64  .075  4.50 .404  13.40 .843  13.08 
Age  65-69  .073  4.39 .376  12.38 .761  11.73 
Age  70-74  .063 3.64  .305 9.66  .619 9.25 
Age  75-79  .050 2.67  .227 6.60  .430 5.98 
ln income at baseline  .010  2.34  .040  5.30  .048  4.17 
Volatility  at  baseline  -.001 1.35  -.003 4.34  -.006 6.01 
Married/single  -.212  7.34 -.273  11.02 -.377  12.25 
Single/married  .292 6.06  .286 6.35  .346 5.87 
Single/single  -.055 4.87  -.165 9.36  -.252 9.70 
Became  widowed  .016 1.33  .058 3.25  .073 2.94 
Kids/no  kids  -.131  6.32 -.220  11.76 -.388  16.18 
No  kids/kids  .055 1.83  .083 2.43  .268 5.54 
No  kids/no  kids  -.029  3.65 -.136  10.13 -.277  12.70 
Change in household size  .128  17.78  .175  28.15  .176  24.21 
Work/not  work  -.015 0.90  -.053 3.33  -.053 2.68 
Not  work/work  -.010 0.43  -.002 0.05  -.032 0.56 
Not  work/not  work  .004 0.44  .002 0.15  -.037 1.79 
Owner  .062 2.04  .169 3.37  .408 5.60 
ln house value (baseline)  -.033  4.49  -.089  7.42  -.150  8.59 
ln home equity (baseline  .005  0.67  .004  0.35  .011  0.74 
(Have negative home equity)  .011  0.40  -.021  0.49  .036  0.58 
Constant  -.097 1.85  -.463 5.09  -.876 6.07 
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Table 13.b 
Models of Changes in Number of Rooms Between Waves—United Kingdom—All 
Horizon 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t 
 
Education—com  sch  leaver  -.016 1.08  -.059 2.51  -.103 2.10 
Education—A  levels  -.011 0.80  .035 1.62  .101 2.25 
Year  at  baseline  .003 1.72  .008 1.74  -.022 1.27 
Age  50-54  -.007 0.38  .078 2.39  .373 5.22 
Age  55-59  .004 0.24  .070 2.29  .193 2.93 
Age  60-64  -.014 0.80  .027 0.93  .225 3.64 
Age  65-69  .001 0.05  .032 1.11  .174 2.88 
Age  70-74  -.007 0.41  -.016 0.58  .081 1.44 
Age  75-79  -.005 0.29  -.009 0.30  .074 1.31 
ln income at baseline  .025  3.21  .063  4.74  .120  4.36 
Volatility  at  baseline  .227 1.75  .294 1.28  -.480 1.16 
Married/single  -.095 1.31  -.405 6.16  -.555 5.12 
Single/married  -.027 0.38  .333 5.02  .446 4.28 
Single/single  .001 0.11  -.006 0.32  .025 0.67 
Became  widowed  .203 2.44  .548 6.95  .897 6.99 
Kids/no  kids  .046 1.11  -.013 0.33  .024 0.30 
No  kids/kids  -.140 1.60  -.055 0.44  .229 1.16 
No  kids/no  kids  -.017 0.84  -.072 2.07  -.215 2.64 
Change in household size  .111  9.64  .152  13.35  .227  11.91 
Work/not  work  -.045 2.14  -.079 3.31  -.106 2.33 
Not  work/work  .016 0.57  .009 0.22  .051 0.60 
Not  work/not  work  -.012 1.02  -.009 0.43  -.005 0.10 
Owner  .108 2.86  .272 4.20  .483 3.60 
ln house value (baseline)  -.019  1.00  -.034  1.27  -.016  0.32 
ln home equity (baseline)  -.003  0.17  -.016  0.75  -.066  1.51 
(Have negative home equity)  .015  0.15  -.244  2.01  -.204  0.92 
Constant  -.256 3.16  -.696 4.87  -.844 2.27 
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Table 14.a 
Models of Change in Ln Value of House Between Waves—United States—Home owners 
who are Movers 
Horizon 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t 
 
Education  13-15  baseline  -.018 0.51  .004 0.12  .063 1.77 
Education >  16  baseline  -.008 0.21  -.046 1.48  .039 1.16 
Trend  -.001 0.46  -.001 0.91  -.013 5.69 
Age  50-54  .070 1.03  .097 1.27  .124 0.98 
Age  55-59  .011 0.17  -.027 0.36  .056 0.44 
Age  60-64  .050 0.76  .039 0.52  .103 0.82 
Age  65-69  .026 0.38  .033 0.43  .143 1.13 
Age  70-74  .017 0.24  -.003 0.03  .013 0.10 
Age  75-79  .045 0.57  -.109 1.24  -.075 0.53 
ln income at baseline  .029  1.98  -.014  0.92  -.016  0.92 
Volatility  at  baseline  -.004 2.42  -.004 2.89  -.002 1.51 
Married/single  -.143 1.62  -.217 4.48  -.229 4.74 
Single/married  .031 0.37  .056 0.87  .136 1.90 
Single/single  -.060 1.41  -.125 3.08  -.011 0.24 
New  Widow  .100 2.02  .048 1.20  -.031 0.75 
Kids/no  kids  -.096 1.51  -.159 3.92  -.182 4.37 
No  kids/kids  -.118 1.30  .316 4.52  .393 4.92 
No  kids/no  kids  -.041 1.39  -.106 3.43  -.142 3.66 
Delta state house price  .608  8.78  .545  13.21  .475  11.80 
Changed  state  -.044 1.06  .137 5.01  -127 4.51 
Constant  -.218 1.41  .367 2.24  .368 1.73 
    61
Table 14.b 
Models of Change in Ln House Value Between Waves—United Kingdom—Home owners 
who are Movers 
Horizon 
   One year  Five years  Ten years 
   Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t 
          
Education  13-15  baseline  .044 0.64  .054 1.60  .105 1.94 
Education > 16 baseline  -.006  -0.08  .101  3.22  .121  2.39 
Trend  .002 0.14  .006 0.43  .019 0.50 
Age  50-54  .204 1.50  .289 4.46  .250 2.39 
Age  55-59  .231 1.74  .252 4.02  .198 1.96 
Age  60-64  .068 0.52  .226 3.60  .183 1.86 
Age  65-69  .116 0.81  .205 3.21  .133 1.34 
Age  70-74  .091 0.65  .145 2.20  .109 1.07 
Age  75-79  .099 0.68  .085 1.25  .062 0.61 
ln income at baseline  .064  1.69  .024  1.22  .081  2.41 
Volatility  at  baseline  -.725 0.77  .258 0.63  -.276 0.47 
Married/single  -.139 0.70  .432 5.75  -.505 4.13 
Single/married  -.045 0.31  .094 1.45  .219 2.06 
Single/single  -.072 1.18  .038 1.20  -.059 1.05 
New  Widow  .055 0.17  .442 3.92  .496 2.79 
Kids/no  kids  -.020 0.10  -.074 1.29  -.099 1.14 
No  kids/kids  -.451 1.58  .015 0.09  -.148 0.84 
No  kids/no  kids  .026 0.24  -.048 0.96  -.144 1.73 
Change in household size  .114  2.38  .116  6.63  .047  1.90 
Work/not  work  -.152 1.62  -.138 3.99  -.081 1.57 
Not  work/  work  .063 0.47  -.039 0.67  .038 0.39 
Not  work/not  work  .005 0.07  -.015 0.44  .013 0.21 
Delta region house price  .309  0.68  .838  9.22  .903  6.61 
Changed  region  -.163 2.71  -.122 4.21  -.019 0.42 
Constant  -.721 1.76  -.398 1.58  -1.010 1.68 
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Table 15.a 
Models of Change in Volatility Between Waves—United States—Movers 
Horizon 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t 
 
Education  13-15  baseline  -.102 1.04  -.276 2.52  -.505 3.84 
Education >  16  baseline  -.028 0.25  -.496 4.33  -1.01 7.43 
Year  at  baseline  .002 0.43  -.002 0.32  -.007 0.94 
Age  50-54  .263 1.83  .434 2.44  .547 1.92 
Age  55-59  .303 2.14  .549 3.14  .689 2.43 
Age  60-64  .275 1.93  .627 3.61  .596 2.11 
Age  65-69  .354 2.45  .347 1.96  .327 1.14 
Age  70-74  -.027 0.17  .253 1.37  .348 1.16 
Age  75-79  .178 1.07  .310 1.49  .215 0.66 
ln income at baseline  .073  2.10  .298  6.71  .509  8.98 
Married/single  -.329 1.85  -.046 0.36  .002 0.01 
Single/married  -.069 0.31  -.253 1.32  .020 0.09 
Single/single  -.130 1.55  -.011 0.11  .116 0.96 
Became  widowed  .043 0.49  .097 1.07  .113 1.05 
Kids/no  kids  .392 2.44  .579 4.84  .332 2.53 
No  kids/kids  .059 0.28  .242 1.24  .344 1.45 
No  kids/no  kids  .163 2.23  .292 3.32  .160 1.37 
Change in household size  .074  1.62  .051  1.51  .037  1.06 
Work/not  work  .499 3.85  .801 8.23  .550 5.31 
Not  work/work  .233 1.34  .207 1.05  .279 0.99 
Not work/not work   .252  3.41  .300  3.52  .193  1.78 
Owner  -.302 1.14  -.636 2.09  -1.32 3.52 
ln house value (baseline)  .080  1.28  .188  2.57  .375  4.18 
ln home equity (baseline)  .074  1.40  .137  2.13  .052  0.65 
(Have negative home equity)  .297  1.37  .597  2.30  .225  0.69 
Constant  -1.316 3.02  -4.055 7.45  -5.568 7.91 
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Table 15.b 
Models of Changes in Volatility Between Waves—United Kingdom—Movers 
Horizon 
  One year  Five years  Ten years 
  Coeff t  Coeff t  Coeff t 
 
Education—com  sch  leaver  -.000 0.09  .001 0.57  .001 0.42 
Education—A  levels  -.001 0.61  .001 0.38  -.000 0.28 
Year  at  baseline  .003 15.48  .016 78.48  .038 54.77 
Age  50-54  -.006 1.98  .003 1.17  -.003 0.81 
Age  55-59  -.007 2.56  .001 0.50  -.007 1.88 
Age  60-64  -.005 1.90  .002 1.15  -.000 0.10 
Age  65-69  -.004  1.5  -.000 0.12  .003 0.84 
Age  70-74  -.002 0.71  -.000 0.21  .002 0.74 
Age  75-79  -.004 1.55  -.000 0.03  .006 1.68 
ln income at baseline  -.001  0.55  .000  0.57  .004  2.61 
Married/single  .002 0.31  -.003 0.95  -.002 0.54 
Single/married  -.001 0.31  .002 0.85  .010 2.63 
Single/single  -.001 0.75  .002 1.29  .005 2.26 
Became  widowed  .001 0.09  .010 2.43  .002 0.33 
Kids/no  kids  .010 1.78  .003 1.27  -.006 1.53 
No  kids/kids  -.010 1.14  -.001 0.22  -.018 2.47 
No  kids/no  kids  -.004 1.12  .002 0.73  -.005 1.35 
Change in household size  .002  1.99  -.000  0.63  -.002  2.14 
Work/not  work  -.002 0.86  -.002 0.96  -.003 1.41 
Not  work/work  -.008 2.07  .004 1.65  .004 1.00 
Not  work/not  work  -.001 0.52  .000 0.10  .001 0.41 
Owner  -.009 1.34  .009 1.99  .001 0.21 
ln house value (baseline)  .004  1.20  -.004  2.10  -.001  0.51 
ln home equity (baseline)  -.002  0.87  .001  1.06  -.001  0.45 
(Have negative home equity)  -.019  1.32  .004  0.60  -.007  0.74 
Constant  -.017  1.43 -.201  -22.26 -.571  34.66 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1 
Differences in Housing Price Volatility by State among Movers in HRS Samples 
 
A. HRS original cohort⎯ages 51-61 




2 years  10 years 
All  owners  who  move   0.078   0.149 
  Owner to renter    0.035    0.092 
  Owner to owner    0.084    0.158 
    
All  renters  who  move   0.049   0.066 
  Renter to renter    0.042    0.069 
  Renter to owner    0.058    0.050 
    




B. AHEAD original cohort ages 70+ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  Eight year transitions 
________________________________________________________________________ 
      70-79  80+  Total 
All owners who 
move 
       0.035    -0.020  0.022 
  Owner to renter          -0.007    -0.073  -0.022 
  Owner to owner          0.041    0.054  0.048 
           
All renters who 
move 
       -0.030    0.132  0.001 
  Renter to renter          -0.004    0.059  0.007 
  Renter to owner          -0.031    0  -0.027 
          
All movers          0.018    0.011  0.020 
________________________________________________________________________. 
 
 
 